The Director of Central Intelligence

I 9 NOV 1986

Washington, D.C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/ICS-86-0954 18 November 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM:

Executive Secretary

SCI Forum

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
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SUBJECT: Minutes of Second Meeting, SCI Forum, 30 October 1986

1. The following documents the events that took place during the second meeting of the SCI Forum on 30 October 1986 in Room 6100. Department of Justice, 1300-1430 hours. Personnel present were:

Maynard Anderson, OSD Stephen E. Bacher, Energy Carl L. Bjorkman, Army ICS Walter J. Breede, Marine Corps CIA NSA DIA William C. Cody, Air Force Clark Dittmer, State ICS Thomas J. Forgas, FBI <u>George Henri</u>ksen, Navy DIA Ted Konduris, Air Force Rebecca A. Long, OSD ICS



- 2. Distributed at the meeting were:
- a listing of Forum members*,
- an agenda for the meeting,

*Recipients are requested to organization to reflect Col Cody	
Management, HQ USAF/INS.	


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	- an Army-provided definition of Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO),
	- the definition of SIO drawn from SISR and IPM, and
25 X 1	 a wiring diagram of the interagency groups for intelligence and security showing participating agencies and their subordinate committees.
	3. In response to the moderator's invitation to approve the minutes of the first meeting, the NSA representative noted that paragraph 8 of the minutes assigned an action which actually had been assigned to CIA (footnote to paragraph 35b of DCID 1/19). With this change, the minutes were approved.
25 X 1	to paragraph 335 or 2015 17 1970 to a version 7
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	5. The State member advised that this issue had been discussed at Secretary Shultz's staff meeting and that the Department's position was that State personnel would only be subject to polygraph examinations (a) in a criminal or counterintelligence investigation or (b) if assigned or detailed to CIA or NSA. In any event, the polygraph would be voluntary. The State member had previously explained this position to the NSA member and expressed
25X1	the hope that the Forum could accommodate the Department's position.
25 X 1	6. The DoD member noted that Defense is opposed to the polygraph for access, but would concur in allowing implementation to be at the discretion of the Cabinet officer or agency head. The State representative advised that
25X1	this would satisfy the Department
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25 X 1	8. The moderator inquired what the Forum could do about this issue. After discussion, it was agreed that NSA would prepare a revised draft to the task force for ultimate Presidential approval of national policy to which DCID 1/14 will adhere. The moderator suggested NSA discuss input with State and DoD to accommodate their concerns.
	9. On DCID 1/7, the CIA representative distributed a handout further
25X1 25X1	defining "headquarters elements."
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of DCI that D	DIA members noted their continuing problem with the NOCONTRACT cavear D 1/7 as expressed in their memo to SECOM of 13 June 1986. (A copy of IA memo is attached as Tab A.) The moderator directed that this be
11	Relative to DCID 1/19, the Army-proposed definition of SIO, with tution of "DCID" for "manual" was accepted.
	The status of other DCIDs was reported:
-	DCID 1/19: Comments on this draft are requested by 14 November. Members are requested to accept/reject NSA-proposed revision of paragraph 35.h. Paragraphs l.e. and 2.b. of the attached DIA memo (Tab B), dated 18 June 1986, require member attention at the next meeting.
1	3. Concerning the HPSCI request for the Community's methods of dealing
with writt	3. Concerning the HPSCI request for the Community's methods of dealing financial vulnerability, the moderator noted that when the agenda was en, few responses had been received. Since then, almost all agencies had and he thanked them.
with writt repli	financial vulnerability, the moderator noted that when the agenda was en, few responses had been received. Since then, almost all agencies had ed, and he thanked them. 4. It was noted that a draft executive order on personnel security was lating in the Community Justice and State noted that consideration
with replired to the control of the	financial vulnerability, the moderator noted that when the agenda was en, few responses had been received. Since then, almost all agencies ha ed, and he thanked them. A It was noted that a draft executive order on perso <u>nnel</u> security was
with writt repli l circu were for t	financial vulnerability, the moderator noted that when the agenda was en, few responses had been received. Since then, almost all agencies had ed, and he thanked them. 4. It was noted that a draft executive order on personnel security was lating in the Community. Justice and State noted that consideration excluded, and it was concluded that the Executive Order was not an issue he Forum. 5. The Air Force member inquired how minutes might be changed, and the ator replied that a written change should be brought to the next

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, DC 2020 57

C-8279/0S-4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/19

Reference: SECOM memorandum D-136, 9 May 1986, subject as above.

- 1. (C) Our position regarding the exceptions cited in the Chairman's basic cover memorandum follows:
 - a. Paragraph a.: Concur.
 - b. Paragraph b: Concur.
- c. Paragraph c: DIA does not concur in the requirement for total document control of facsimile materials transmitted via secure methods. Current use of the document receipt system currently in effect within DIA appears adequate. DIA supports the subcommittee position on this.
 - d. Paragraph d: Concur.
- e. Paragraph e: All paragraphs, subparagraphs should be marked, whether UNCLASSIFIED or not. Alternatively, subparagraphs need not be marked if of the same classification of the primary paragraph.
- 2. (C) The following comments and/or proposed changes in the DCID itself apply:
- a. Introduction paragraph a: Upon deactivation of DCI Security Committee (SECOM) to whom should questions on the manual be addressed?
- b. Personnel Security: Paragraph 9, "Security Indoctrination and Education, subparagraph b. second sentence, page 7: Delete underscored portion: The indoctrination will describe the vulnerabilities of the systems to which access is granted,...."

Rationale: As written the sentence carries operational connotations. If the intent is to describe personnel/physical security vulnerabilities of the systems then the sentence should be reconstructed or the phrase deleted.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

CHARLES J. LITTLE

Colonel, USA

Assistant Deputy Director for Security and Counterintelligence

Marlie, France

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

CCISCMS/ICS:AO'Connor:dmf Distribution of DCI/ICS-86-0954: 1 - Maynard C. Anderson, OSD 1 - Maurice Ralston, OSD 1 - Carl L. Bjorkman, Army 1 - George Henriksen, Navy 1 - William C. Cody, Air Force 1 - Walter J. Breede, Marine Corps
1 - DIA STAT NSA STAT 1 -1 - Gary L. Stoops, FBI 1 - Clark M. Dittmer, State 1 - David Major, NSC CIA STAT] -CIA STAT 1 -1 - Jerry Rubino, Justice 1 - Stephen E. Bacher, DoE 1 - William O'Donnell, Treasury 1 - ICS Registry 1 - CCISCMS subject 1 - D/CCISCMS chrono